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INTRODUCTION 
Rosetta Stone's opposition spends pages talking about. things other than Dr. Van Liere's 
survey and methodology. It spends the first two pages discussing Google's 2004 in-house 
experiments, vari'Ous employees' and c~nsi.Jme[s' (m i$ir:'t~rpreted) statements regarding likely 
confusioD, and, later, a. confusion survey conducted by a different expert in r. different case. 
(Opp. at 2-4, 13.) Rosetta Stone's diversion tactics are irrelevant to whether Dr. Van Liere's 
survey is admissible evidence of likely consumer confusion. Rosetta Stones theory that other 
evidence can confer admissibility upon Dr. Van Liere and his survey defies the gatc·keeping role 
of the Court. 
The questi<?n presented by Google's motion is whether Dr. Van Liere's survey-and not 
any other evidence-is admissible evidence of likely consumer confusion. The answer is 00. 
First, Rosetta SlOne concedes that Dr. Van Liere's survey tested only for initial interest 
confusion-a theoI)' of liability not recognized in this Circuit Dr. Van Liere's survey is 
therefore irrelevant. Secon.d. Dr. Van Liere improperly 'counted as confused the respondents who 
indicated that Amazon.com's and Coupon Cactus's advertisements were endorsed by Rosetta 
Stone, as both Amazon.com and Coupon Cactus were authorized to use Rosetta Stone's 
trademarks in their advertisements when Google displayed the ads Dr. Van Liere used. When 
those respondents are properly counted as not confused, Dr. Van Liere's survey demonstrates 
that no respondents (·3%) were confused. For this additional reason, Dr: Van Liere's survey is 
irrelevant. Third, Dr. Van Lier.'s methodology is fatally flawed., and his conclusions a,e 
therefore unreliable and irrelevant. For each of these reasons, any evidence Dr testimony of 
confusion based on Dr. Van Lie,e's survey should be ."duded. 
1 
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A-1<.GUi\1ENT 
Rosetta Stone argues that a survey's technical deficiencies go to its evidentiary weight 
and not its admissibility. (Opp. at 8-9, 15-17.) But it is well established that a survey tllat is 
more prejudicial than probative is inadmissible. Dauberf v. A{errill Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 
579, 588 (1993) (noting that survey evidence may be excluded under Rule 403 when more . 
prejudicial than prohative); 6 r Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair 
Compelition § 32:158 ("There is no doubt that a trial court, in the exercise of its 'gatekeeping 
function may. in an appropriate case, exclude a surVey report from being received into 
evidence."). The court's role as a gatekeeper is particularly important where, as here, a case 
involves ajury trial. Simon Prop. Group L.P. v. mySimon Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1039 n.3 
(S.D. Ind. 2000) ("The court has a responsibility to the jurors not to waste their time. or to make 
their task unduly difficult by admitting evilience that is likely to be complex and time-
consuming, as this sUlVey evidence would be. when it offers essentially nothing of real probative 
value. Rule 403 was written fo r just this s.ort of case."). 
Even the decisions Rosetta Stone cites acknowledge that a survey that is more prejudicial 
than probative should not be admitted. See Schering Corp. v. Pfizer Inc., 189 F.3d 218, 228 (2d 
eir. 1999) (noting that survey evidence is "subject ... to Rule 403 '5 more general prohibition 
against evidence that is less probative than prejudicial or confusing"); ASP Subsidiary Holding 
Co_ v. Stuart Hale Co., I F.3d 6ll, 618 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that a survey can be "so flawed as 
to be completely unhelpful to the trier of ract and therefore inadmissible'); Whirlpool Props., 
Inc. v. LG Elecs. US.A., Inc., 2006 WL 62846, at °2 (\V.D. Mich. Ian 10, 2006) (same). When 
its flaws are considered and its evidentiary weight properly discounted, Dr. Van Liere's survey is 
clearly more prejudicial than probative, and must be exc.luded_ 
2 
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I. DR. VAN LIERE'S SURVEY IS I.RF.ELEVANT BECAUSE INITIAL INTEREST 
CONFUSION IS NOT A PROPER BASIS FOR LIABILITY IN THIS CIRCUIT 
It is fundamental that expert testimony will not be admitted unless it will "assist the trier 
of fact to understand tl,e evidence or to determine a fact ia issue." Fed. R. Evid. 702; see 
Dauber!. 509 U.S. c.t 591. Thus. when eXperts opine on irrelevant issues, c;ou..'1.s must exclude 
their testimony. See. e.g., Sherman v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 263 Fed. App'x 357, 
368-69 (4th Cir. 2008) (excluding expert who did not address the issue presented); United Siales 
v. lslamder, 407 F.3d 232, 238 (4th Cir. 2005) (same); Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp .• 3 i j 
FJd 264,278-80 (4th CiL 2002) (snme). 
Here, Rosetta Stone concedes that Dr. Van Liere's survey tests only for initial interest 
confusion (Opp. at 19), but the Fourth Circuit has expressly declined to adopt initial interest 
confusion as a proper basis for liability. (See Goagle's Opp. To Rosetta. Stone's Partial Summ. J. 
Mot. at 9-12); Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 FJd 309, 316 (4th Cir. 2005). In Lampa7ello, the 
Fourth Circuit expressly declined to adopt initial interest confusion as a basis for trademark 
infringement liability. 420 F Jd at 316. The court explained that it has "never adoped the initial 
interest confusion theory" and instead has "followed a very different mode of analysis. requiring 
courts to determine whether a likelihood of confusion exists by examining the aliegedly 
infringing use in lhe COniext in which it is seer. by the ordi1lary con .. 'l:urner." fd. (emphasis added; 
quotation marks omitted). 
Rosetta Stone admits that Dr. Van Liere focused on testing initial interest confusion and 
did not pennit Users to click actual links or even simulated links that would give consumers more 
information about the advertiser and the advertised products. (Opp. at 18-19.) Dr. Van Liere's 
survey therefore did not examine "the aUegedly infringing use in the context in which it is seen 
by the ordinary consumer" as Lamparello reguires. 420 F.3d at 316. As such, Dr. Van Liere's 
3 
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survey results cannot have any tendency to prove actionabie confusio". Fed. R. Evid. 401. It 
must th~refore be excluded. 
II. DR. VAN LIERE llvlPROPERLY COUNTED AS CONFUSED RESPONDENTS 
"IiRO ANSWERED TRAT AMAZON. COM'S AND COUPON CACTUS'S lillS 
WERE ENDORSED BY ROSETTA STONE -
Rosetta Stone asserts that Dr. Van Liere properly counted as confused the respondents 
who answered that the Sponsored Links of Amazon.com and Coupon Cactus were endorsed by 
Rosetta Stone because it contends that those· advertisers were nat authorized to use Rosetta 
Stone's trademarks c, their ads_ (Opp. at 27-29.) Rosetta Stone is wrong. Both Amazon.com 
and Coupon Cactus were authorized to use Rosetta Stone's trademarks in their ads on February 
21, 2008, when Googl. displayed the search results page that Dr. Van Liere used to create the 
test and control conditions. (Caruso Dec!. In Supp. Of Googl.'s SumItL I. Mot. ("Caruso 
Decl.'~). Exs. 42-43 (vendor agreement providing Amazon.com a license to use Rosetta Stone's 
trademarks); Caruso Deel., Exs. 19,42-43, 66 at 166:14-24, 176:2-14; Galvin Dec!. In Supp. Of 
Google's Summ. J. Mot. ("Galvin Dec!. "), Ex. 3 at 166:-19-24 (testifying that Coupon Cactus was 
an affiliate in 2008); Caruso DecL, ~ 48.) Rosetta Stone cannot reasonably dispute this fact. 
Even if Rosetta Stone had not expressly authorized this use, these two ads were nonetheless 
appropriately recognized as endorsed by Roserta Stone as a result of Rosetta Stone's actual 
cotmnercial and contractual relationships with Amazon.com as an authorized reseUer and 
Coupon Cactus as a premier affiliate of Rosetta Stone. Thus, respondents who correctly 
identified those links as endorsed should not have beeo. counted as confused. 
When those respondents who identified the ads of Amazon.com or Coupon Cactus as 
endorsed are properly counted 3.S not confused, Dr. Van Liere's survey data reflects that no 
respondents were confused as a result of Sponsored Liru,cs appearing on Google. Indeed, the "net 
confusion" rate drops to -3%; in other words, "confusion'" was higher among those who did not 
4 
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see the Sponsored Links. This correction alone requires preclusion of any mention of Dr. Van 
Liere's survey as evidence ofactionabJG confusion. 
A. Amazon.com Lawfully Used Rosetta Stone', Trademarks. 
It is well established that a reselJer may use a tr~demark to refer to a product originating 
from the trademark o"'"er. See, e.g., Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S . 125, 130 
(1947) (noting that a "s.econd-hand dealer gets some advantage frofu the trade mark' but that this 
is "wholly pennissible"); Shell Oil CO. Y. Commercial Petro/eu"" Inc., 928 F.2d 104, 107 (4th 
Cir. 1991) (noting that "trademark law does not apply to the sale of genuine goods bearing a true 
mark, even if the sale is wjthollt the mark owner's consent" (emphasis added)); Tiffany (Nl) Inc. 
v. eBay Inc. , 2010 WL 1236315, at *7 (2d Cir. Apr. 1,2010) (holding that "eBay's use of 
Tiffany's mark [to describe genuine goods1 on its website and in sponsored links was lawful"); 
Sebastialllnt'!, Inc. v. Longs Drug Siores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1074 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Resale by 
the fJ'st purchaser of the origin2.1 article under the producer's trademark: is neither trademark 
infringement nor unfair competition."). Here, it is undisputed that Amazon.com is aRmetta 
Stone reseller. (Opp. at 28 (noting that "Amazon. com is an authorized reseller of Rosetta Stone 
software'').) Thus) Amazon.com's use of Rosetta Stone's trademarks to refer to genuine Rosetta 
'Stone products was authorized by law, even if nor by Rosetta stone. However. evidence in the 
record shows that it was also expressly authorized by Rosetta Stone. (Caruso Decl., Ex •. 4243 
(vendor agreement providing A.m.azon.com a license to use Rosetta Stone's trademarks).) 
Because Amazon.com:s use of Rosetta Stone's trademarks was authorized, respondents 
who identified Amazon.com's ad as endorsed should not have been counted .as confused. 
Contrary to Rosetta Stone's position, a reseller's right to use a trademark "is not rendered 
inapplicable merely because consumers erroneously believe the [eseHer is affiliated with or 
authorized by the producer." Sebastian [nt'l, Inc., 53 F.3d at 1076 (reversing a grant of a 
5 
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preliruinary injunction based on the first sale doctrine, despite evidence of consumer confusion). 
That is true because a reseller's use of a trademark "does not create a likelihood of confusion 
within the meaning of the [Lanham Act) statute." Ballet Mahm. Inc. v. U.S. Shee Corp., 633 F. 
Supp. 1328, 1335 (S.D .NY 1986); see Briliiance Audio.' Inc. v. Haights Cross Cammc 'IlS, Inc., 
474 F.3d 365, 369 (6th CiL 2007) (noting that "trademark law is designed to prevent sellers from 
confusing or deceiving consumers about the origin or make of a product, which confusion 
ordinarily does not exist when a genuine article bearing a true mark is sold" (citation and 
quotation marks omitted)); McCoy v. Milsuboshi Cutlery, [nc., 67 F .3d 917, 924 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(holding that "the sale of genuine goods, even if unauthorized, carmot cause confusion and 
consequently cannot constitute trademark infringement"). In fact, confusion caused by a 
reseller's use of a trademark is "legally irrelevant" and should be excluded as it "might confuse 
the jury." Mary Kay. Inc. V. Weber, 601 F. Supp. 2d 839, 849 (N.D. Tex. 2009). Thus, it was 
improper for Dr. Van Liere to count as confused those respondents who indicated that 
Amazon.com's ad was endorsed by Rosetta Stone. 
B. Coupon Cactus Lawfully Used Rosett:l Stone1s Trademarks. 
Rosetta Stone argues that Coupon Cactus was not authorized to use the Rosetta Stone 
trademarks when Dr. Van Liere 's survey was conducted in April and May 2009. (Opp. at 28-
29.) But the actual ,ereenshot used in the survey was created from Google.com on February 21 , 
2008. (Caruso Decl., ~ 48 (showing that the filename of screensho! indicates !pat it was created 
on February 21, 2008).) At that time, Coupon Cactus was a premiere Rosetta Stone affiliatlo, 
under contract with Rosetta Stene, and authorized to lise Rosetta Stone's marks in keyword 
bidding and in the teKt of ads. (Opp. at 28 ("Rosetta Stone has not authorized Coupon Cactus to 
bid on or use Roset", Stone' s mark in its Sponsored .Links since September 2008."); Caruso 
6 
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Decl., Exs. 19,4243,66 at 166:14-24, 176:2-14; Galvin Ded., Ex. 3, 166:19-24 (testifYing that 
Coupon Cactus was an affiliate in 2008).) 
Rosetta Stone also conveniently fails to mention that Google's database records reflect 
that Coupon Cactus has: not advertised llSing Rosetta Stone's mark as a keyword since September 
2008. (Caruso Decl., Ex. 50.) It was therefore improper for Dr. Van Liere to count as confused 
those respondents who identiiied Coupon Cactus's ad as endorsed by Rosetta Stone. Furt.o.er, 
like Amazon, Coupon Cactus's ad directed consumers to genuine Rosetta Stone products (an 
undisputed point). Thus, Coupon Caerus's use of Rosetta Stone's trademarks was, like 
Amazon..com's use, pennissibJe under trademark law. (See, .supra, 5~6.) It was improper for Dr. 
Van Liere to count as "confusw.," for purposes of a "confusion" survey. those respondents who 
indicated that Coupon Cactus's ad wa') endorsed by Rosetta Stone. 
Had Dr. Van Liere properly counted the respondents who stated that Amazon.com's and 
Coupon Cactus' 5 ads were endorsed by Rosetta Stones his survey would have demonstrated that 
no consumers (i.e., -3%) were confused. (Blair Decl., ~ 1-8.) Dr. Van Liere's survey is therefore 
irrelevant and should be excluded.' 
I Rosetta Stone argues that the opinions of Dr. Edward A. Blair, Google's confusion 
expert, should be given less ",eight because Dr. Blair did not conduct his own Iikelihood-of-
confusion survey. (Opp. at 13-15.) That criticism is misguided. First, and contrary to Rosetta 
Stone's assertion, Gomde clid not have sufficient to time to conduct a survey to rebut Dr. Van 
Liere's survey. Googl~ did not receive Dr. Van Liere"s report until De.cember 14,2009. (See 
Ex?ert Report of Dr. Kent Van Liere, p. 13.). With. deadline for expert disclosures of January 
13,2010 (which presented significant holiday scheduling issues), Google would have had less 
than a month to conduct a responsive survey. (See Dkt. No. 38.) Rosetta Stone cannot seriously 
argue that Google should have designed and conducted a rebuttal confusion survcy in less than a 
month, especiaUy since Dr. Van Liere's survey took approximately two months to complete. 
(See Van Liere Depo., 30:3-11.) Second, there is no requirement that an e><pert conduyi his own 
survey before his criticisms of another expert' s survey will be considered. Indeed. Rosetta 
Stone cites no decision for that proposition, and court;'s routinely consider expert reports 
criticizing surveys from experts who did not conduct their own surveys. See, e.g. , Smith v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1324-25 (N.D. Ga- 2008) (finding that a defendant's 
7 
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m. DR. V.".1'< LIERE'S METHODOLOGY IS FATALLY FLAWED 
A survey should be designed to test what happens in the ma.rketplace, not to produce a 
desired outcome. Here, howeyerl Dr. Van Liere carefully crafted his survey methodology to 
produce a desired outcome. Therefore, it shduld be exclu"ded. 
A. Dr. Van Liere Failed To Sufficiently Replicate Actual Marketplace 
Conditions. 
Rosetta Stone admits that Dr. Van Liere provided survey respondents with a manipulated 
screenshot of a Google search results page that had no clickable links and no ads paid for by 
Rosetta Stone. (Opp. at 17-21.j Rosetta Stone does not argue that consumers have ever been 
presented with a similar Google search results page in the actual marketplace. Instead, Rosetta 
Stone argues that a clickable link was unnecessary because Dr. Van Liere tested only for in itial 
interest confusion (Opp. at 19) and that an advertisement from Rosetta Stone W2S unnecessary 
because Rosetta Stone only advertises on Google search to mitigate hann from Google1s alleged 
infringing conduct (Opp. at [9-20). Neither of these uexplanations" change the fact that 
respondents saw a manipulated screen shot, and this error justifies the exclusion of Dr. Van 
Liere's survey. See Simon· Prop. Group, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1052. 
Rosetta Stone's argument that a clickable link was unnecessary because Dr. Van Liere 
tested 9nly for initial interest confusion and "any 'contextual clues' provided to respondents by 
c!icking the Sponsored Links would be irrelevant" to a measure of initia l interest confusion fails. 
As discussed above, the Fourth Circuit has expressly decli~ed to adopt initial interest confusion 
as a proper basis for imposing liability. (See, supra, at 34.) Indeed, in Lamparello, the Fourth 
expert was qualified to provide testimony about assumptions in plaintiffs survey, even though 
he conducted no survey for defendant); . E. & J Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle CD., 967 F.2d 
'1280, 1293 (9th Cir. 1992) (same); Pro-Foothall, Inc. v. Ht11jo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 110 (D.D.C. 
2003) (same). Third, that Dr. Blair did not conduct a study is irrelevant to most of his 
criticisms- including, for exampJe, whether Amazo~.com and Coupon Cactus were authorized 
to use Rosetta Stone's touiemarks. -
8 
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Circuit stated that, in the context of domain names) "a court must evaluate the allegedly 
infringing domain name in conjunction with the content of the website identified by the domain 
name." 420 F 3d at 316. Thus, under the Fourth Circuit's approach, the content of the site is .t 
the heart of the likelihood of confusion analysis. and fa.ilure to provide respondents with these 
contex:tual clues fatally undennines Dr. Van Liere's survey results. 
Similarly. Rosetta Stone I s argument that a Rosetta Stone ad need not be included on the 
search re.su1ts page shown to respondents because Rosetr.a Stone only advertises on Google 
search to mitigate harm from Google's alleged infringing conduct is misplaced. It is undisputed 
that, in the actual marketplace. respondents would have see.n an ad from Rosetta Stone in 
response to the query "Rosetta Stone.lI It was therefore improper for Dr. Van Liere to 
intentionally distort the survey to remove the Rosetta Stone ad from the search page shown to 
respondents-what i5 at issue in this case is whether what Google actually displays to 
GOGgle.com users constitutes actionable trademark infringement. See Simon Prop. Group, 104 
F. Supp. 2d at ' 1042-44 (excluding survey for departing from and distorting the actual 
marketplace by eliminating content). 
Dr. Van Liere~s survey method failed to replicate actual marketplace conditions, and his 
survey, and any testimony regarding it, should therefore be excluded. 
B. Dr. Van Liere Failed To Use An Adequate Control Stimulus. 
Rosetta Stone contends that Dr. Van Liere's survey shows that Sponsored Links are more 
likely to confuse consumers than organic links - not that commercial links, or links that refer to 
Roset't.A Stone software, are more likely to confuse consumers than non-commercial links or lir..ks 
that refer to Rosetta Stone the historical artifact. (Opp. at 5.) To test this proposition, Dr. Van 
Lie,e should have chosen a control stimulus that controlled for the differences in the balance of 
9 
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sponsored and organic links. Dr. Van Liere did not do that. Instead, he selected a control 
stimulus that displayed far fewer commercial links and far fewer links referring to Rosetta Stone 
sofware than what was presented in his test condition. His survey is therefore umdiable. See 
THOIP v. Walt Disney Co., 2010 WI.. 447049, at ·14 (S.D .N.Y. Feb. 9, 2010) (excluding survey 
for failing to use an adequate conlrol). 
Rosetta Stone argues that Dr. Van Lierc's control was proper because it "is identical to 
the test stimulus except tbat the control does not include the Sponsored Links." (Opp. at 21.) 
However, Rosetta Stone ignores that by removing its Sponsor::d Link., which is a commercial 
link, Dr. Van Liere skewed the catio of both commercial to non-corrunercial links and links 
referring to Rosetta StoEle (the plaintiff) to links referring to other Rosetta entities, including 
those affiliated with tbe historical Rosetta SCone artifact. This change fundamentally altered the 
nature of the page in a way beyond what was being tested in the survey_ 
Rosetta Stone tries to downplay the effects of this fundamental cbange by arguing that the 
organic links presented on both pages are ident ical. This misses the point that the overall 
number of links, in both the organic and sponsored link results, do not contain the same ratio of 
commerciai-to-non-cornmerciallinks and plainti,ff-to-non-plaintiff links. Thus, the results of the 
survey could simply show that respondents were more likely to believe that commercial links 
'that refer to Rosetta Stone language learning software are more likely to be endorsed by Rose~", 
Stone, the language learning company, than non-commercial links teferencing the Rosetta Stone 
artifact. This sh.eds.no light on the relevant question of confusion here. 
Rosetta Stone's assertion that "Google's rea! complaint is not with tbe manner in which 
Dr. VanLiere created the control stimulus, but with the selection of the screenshot on which both 
the test and control stimuli are based" is incorrect (Opp. at 22.) Google's complaint is with 
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both. N, discussed, the creation of the control failed to adjust for the effects of removing tl,,, 
sponsored link on the balance of the types oflinks present on the search results page. Dr. Van 
Liere's selection of an unbalanced Google screenshot exaggerated the effects of the first error. 
For example, had Dr. Van Liere selected a sereemhot Ihllt had Amazon.com in both the organic 
and Sponsored Link sections, rhe control would have been more balanced and the survey would 
have been able to measure the differences in confusion between the Amazon.com link as a 
Sponsored Link and the same link as an organic result. (Caruso Decl., Exs. II, 13, 16. 17.) Dr. 
Van Liere's failure to do so renders his results meaningless.2 
Moreover, Dr. Van Liere did not simply choose a representative Google search result 
page. Rosetta Stone provided him with a number of screenshots of Google search results. 
(Caruso Decl., Exs. 8-19.) Four of those screenshots contained links ro Amazon.com in both the 
sponsored and organic links. (Caruso Decl., Exs. II, 13, 16, 17.) But he chose a search results 
page that displayed no commercial link: to Rosetta Stone in its organic resulls-and no 
Sponsored Link that did not refer to Rosetta Stone (tbe plaintiff) or contain an ad critical of 
Rosetta Stace. (Caruso. DecL, Ex. 19.) That was improper. I( is equivalent to testing whether a 
60-second commercial is confusing by displaying a single screenshot of that commercial, rather 
than the entire commercial. Dr. Van Liere should have sclec1ed a control that was typical of 
Google search result pages. He did not. He chose a control stimulus that displayed fewer 
commercia.l sites as organic liltks than is typical, thereby distorting the survey resuits. 
2 Rosetta Stone argues that Google has no grounds to complain about the number and 
types of links on the selected search results page because Google determines what links will . 
show. (Opp. at 19-21.) Dr. Van Liere actually altered the search results page in his study, so it 
is not correct to say that Google detennined the layout of these Rages. Dr. Van Liere was also 
provided with a number of different possible screen shots to use (Google's search results page 
can change an a querf by query basis depending on the time and location of a search). Yet he 
plainly chose the one he thought would give the most favorable results to.Rosetta Stone. 
II 
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Rosetta Stone also argues that Dr. Van Liere property counted as not confused those 
respondents who correctly answered the "filter" survey question C"\Vhich links or links if any ... 
sells Rosetta Stone language software products?), even though those respondents were not asked 
the subsequent sllIVey questions designed to ies! confusio'n ("fW1hich links or links, if any. are 
endorsed by the Rosetta Stone company?"). [n suppon of this argument, Rosetta Stone asserts 
that it is reasonable to assume thllt respondents who did not believe a link sold Rosetta Stone 
software would not believe that the link was owned or endorsed by Rosetta Stone. COpp. at 23-
24.) But that assumption is rnet.~odoiogically unsound. Respondents could very well have 
believed that some of the links, though not selling Rosetta Stone's product, were owned or 
endorsed by Rosetta Stone. In fac~ under Dr, Van Liere's definition of "endorsed" (which was 
never explained to respondents), the \Vikipedia enny for Rosetta Stone was uendorsedn by 
Rosetta Stone, 'even though it did not actually sell Rosetta Stone products. Because Dr. Van 
Liere never gave these respondents the opportunity to express confusion, they should not have 
been included as not confused in the calculation of confusion rates.) Tellingly. when they are 
omitted, the "net confusion rate" becomes 5%. (B12ir. Decl., ~~ 13·14.) 
c. Dr. Van Liere Failed To Target The Appropriate Universe Ofeonsumers. 
"Selection of the proper universe [in a survey] is so critical that eVen if the proper 
questions are asked in a proper rnanner~ if the w1'Ong persons are asked, the results are likely to 
be irrelevant" Smith y. Wal-Mart Stores. Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1343 (N.D. Ga. 2008) 
(quotation mades and citation omitted). Dr Van Liere's selection of an overbroad universe 
renders his survey irrelevant. 
3 Rosetta St~ne's argument that the properly~c.alculated confusion rates of 75% and 73% 
were "excessively high" does not show that "Google's proposed protocol is ,f1awe~" so much as 
it shows tliatDr. Van Lie,e's survey. methodology, and ill particular its failure to define the term 
c;endorsed," was flawed, 
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-Rosetta Stone acknowledges that the relevant universe her~ consists of <:United States 
consumers who would potentially use Google's search services to gather infonnation about the 
purchase of products and services from Rosetta Stone or to purcbase products and services from 
Rosetta Stone." (Opp. at 25.) For a user to conduct such: a search on Goagle.com, the user must 
be able to recall the brand Rosetta Stone and enter that brand as a search query. Only consumers 
with unaided brand recall would be able to do so. Dr. Van Liere did not survey such a 
population. 
Rosetta Stone argues, without evidence, rhat Dr. Van Liere's screening question, which 
tested for aided brand recaU, "adequately ensured that the respondents were sufficiently familiar 
with Rosetta Stone" and that "restricting the survey to only [consumers with unaided brand 
cecall] would be inappropriate." (Opp. at 26.) Rosetta Stone's failure to explain how someone 
with only aided brand recall could search ·for Rosetta. Stone without prompting by an interviewer 
is unsurprising, as there is no reasonable justification. Rosetta Stone' 5 own documents show that 
the universe of people \vith unaided brand recall is far smaller than the universe with aided 
recall. (Lien Dec!. In Supp. Of Google's Sumrn. J. Reply ("Lien Reply Dec!."), Ex. 3 (indicating 
that aided brand. awareness exceeded unaided brand awareness by 29%).) 
Rosetta Stone further argues that Dr. Van Liere's decision to conduct the surveys in mails 
wi'hout Roset"t.a Stone kiosks was proper because "the malls were specifically selected to ensure 
the population was representative of consumers who might be seeking jnformation about Rosetta 
Stone's products." (Opp. at 27.) Rosetta Stone cites to no evidence to support this statement 
To the contrary, Dr. Van Liere's report indicated that the cities and malls were actually selected 
only to ensure geographical and not economic or educational representativeness. (Caruso Decl. , 
Ex. 45.) Moreover, though Dr. Van Liere's screening questions tllrgeted panicular age and 
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gender quotas, they did not seek representative quotas for educational level or income. (Jd. at'! 
18.) Since Rosetta Stone's target market consists of individuals with higher levels of education 
and income than the general popUlation. this failure to screen for such demographic 
characteristics undermines Dr. Van Liere's 5un'ey result-so (Caruso Dec!., Exs. 34, 35. 69 at 
86:20-88:i.) Indeed, it is particularly problematic that Dr. Van Liere excluded the very malls 
Rosetta Stone chase to invest resources in, presumably on the basis that those mall goers were 
most likefy to purchase its products and instead fo cused on other malls in the same cities. 
Dr. Liere' 5 failure to target the appropriate universe of consumers renders his survey 
unreliable, and his survey and any testimony regarding it should be excluded. 
D. Dr. Van Liere Failed To Provide Respondents A Definition Of "Endorsed." 
Rosetta Stone admits the only type of confusion Dr. Van Lien~ claims to have found in 
his survey is confusion as to "endorsement" by Rosetta Stone. (Opp. at 8.) Although this Court 
dismissed Rosetta Stone's endorsement.ciairo, Rosetta Stone argues that Dr. Van Liere's survey 
is nevertheless relevant because "confusion as to affiliation, endorsement. or association is 
actionable under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)." (Opp. at IO.) The cases Rosetta Stone cites discuss 
confusion as to sponsorship, and do not state that endorsement and sponsorship are the same 
thing. See AMP Inc. v. Fay" 540 F.2d 11 81. 11 84 (4th CiL 1976)("The public is protected from 
being confused as to the sponsorship of goods or services purchased." (emphasis added»); 
Anheuser-Busch. inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 318 (4th CiL 1992) ("In other words, 
an unauthorized use of a trademark infringes the trademark holder's rights if it is likely to 
confuse an 'ordinary consumer' as to the source or sponsorship of the goods." (emphasis added; 
citation omitted}). Even if endorsement confusion was actionable under § 1114(1), Rosetta 
SlOne fails to explain how that claim would be any different from the endorsement claim this 
Court already dismissed. 
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In any event, given that the relevancy of Dr. Van Liere's survey hinges entirely oil its 
supposed finding of endorsement confusion and the lack of clarity as to exactly what 
«endorsement" -means, Dr. Van Liere 's failure to provide a definition ofthe term 10 respondents 
is particularly troubling. Indeed, Rosetta 'Stone's entire argument about why Wikipedia was 
"endorsed" and Amazon.com, an authorized reseUer, and Coupon Cactus, a preferred affiliate: 
were not, illustrates precisely how ambiguous the term endonement is in the context of Dr. Van 
Liere's survey. Reasonable minds could differ about whether a site is "endorsed" (as used in the 
survey) by someone w ho contributes to its content,. or whether a site is "endorsed" because it is 
permitted to resell the endorser's products. Without having provided more clarity to the 
respondents, it is impossible to know whether their definitions of "endorsernenf' reflect 
actionable confusion under the Lanham AcL~ 
To make matters worse, Dr. VanLiere ignored the one piece of infonnation gathered 
from respondents that could have indicated whether their confusion wa.o:; actionable or not. 
Although respondents were asked why they though! the particular site was endorsed by ·Rosetta 
Stene: Dr. Van Liere failed to take that into account in calculating his confusion rates. Thus, if a 
respondent indicated that he thought Rosetta Stone "endorsed" Amazon.com because it allowed 
Amazon.com to se ll its products, that respondent would not be confused, though Dr. Van Liere 
would have counted nim as so. This was precisely the type of error fo,which the court in Mary 
Kay, Inc. v. Weber criticiud Dr. Van Liere. 601 F. Supp. 2d 839, 849 (N.D. Tex. at 2009) 
(holding that Dr. Van. Liere should have considered explanations given as to why respondents 
were confused because some believed that defendant's site was affiliated with plaintiff only 
.: Contrary to Rosetta Stone's assertion, the fact that one of Google's counsel used the 
word "endorsement" in e deposition without defining the word has absolutely nothing to do with 
whether Dr. Van Liere' s failure to define this critical word in the context of his sUlVey was 
proper. 
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because they sold plaintiffs products). 1"1 Mar)' Kay, the court excluded "the bald assertion toat 
forty five percent of interviewees were confused" because that number included legalJy 
irrelevant confusion. !d. at 849. Similarly here, Dr. Van Liere 's opinions, data, and testimony 
regarding legally irrelevant confusion should be excluded .. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing reasons and all papers submitted by Google in cormection with its 
Motion to Exclude. the Court should exclude Dr. Van Lief(~ ' s survey and any testimony 
regarding it. 
lsi 
lonathan D. Frieden, Esquire (VSB No. 41452) 
Stephen A. Cobb, Esquire (VSB No. 75876) 
ODIN, FELDMAN & PITTLEMAN, P.C. 
9302 Lee Highway, Suite liDO 
Fairfax, Virginia 22031 -
(703) 218-2100 
(703) 218-2160 (facsimile) 
jonathan.friedenuuofplaw.com 
stephen.cobb{@,ofolaw.com 
Respectfully Submitted, 
GOOGLEINC. 
By counsel 
Margret M. Caruso, Esquire (Admitted Pro Hac Vice) 
QUINN, EMA."IUEL, URQUHART & SULLlV AN, LLP 
555 Twin Dolphin Drive, Suite 560 
Redwood Shores, California 94065 
(650) 801-5101 
(650) 801-5100 (facsimile) 
ma.rgretcaruso@quinnemanuel.com 
Counsel for Defendant Coogle Inc. 
16 
6622 
